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Abstract
We	built	a	simple	model	of	an	idealized	labor	market,	in	which	there	is	no	objective	difference	in
average	quality	between	groups	and	hiring	decisions	are	not	biased	in	favor	of	any	particular	group.
Our	results	show	that	inequality	in	employment	emerges	necessarily	also	in	such	idealized	situations
due	to	the	limited	supply	of	high	quality	individuals	and	asymmetric	information.	Inequalities	are
exacerbated	when	employers	have	high	standards	and	keep	only	the	best	workers	in	house.	We
found	that	ambitious	workers	get	higher	quality	jobs	even	if	ambition	does	not	correlate	or	even
negatively	correlates	with	internal	quality.	Our	findings	help	to	corroborate	empirical	findings	on	higher
employment	discrepancies	in	high	rather	than	low	status	jobs.
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Introduction
1.1 	Inequalities	persist	in	many	different	human	social	contexts,	such	as	in	the	labor	market,	in	inter-firm
relations	and	in	partner	selection	for	marriage.	In	two-sided	matching	problems,	it	is	generally	difficult	to
establish	and	maintain	efficient	selection	mechanisms	(Roth	&	Sotomayor	1990;	Shiba	2013).	Labor
market	models	showed	that	inefficient	outcomes	and	a	frequent	mismatch	between	employer	demands
and	worker	skills	are	likely	to	emerge	(Lucas	&	Prescott	1974;	Burdett	&	Mortensen	1980;	Diamond
1981;	1982;	Mortensen	1986;	Flabbi	2010),	but	did	not	focus	on	consequential	processes	leading	to
inequality.
1.2 	One	of	the	most	important	consequences	of	asymmetric	information	is	that	employers	cannot	check
individual	employee	quality	or	skills	in	advance	and	tend	to	rely	on	signals	(Frank	2007;	Spence	1973,
Spence	1974;	Gambetta	2009)	and	external	characteristics	for	hiring	(Akerlof	1976).	Easily	recognizable
traits,	such	as	gender,	ethnicity,	or	age	are	the	most	salient	social	categories	immediately	encoded	in
any	interaction	(Fiske	1998).	In	the	absence	of	individual	information,	employers	read	these	traits	as
cues.	When	information	is	hard	to	collect,	recognizable	social	category	membership	is	often	used	to
form	group	reputation	and	prejudices,	which	are	used	as	proxies	to	estimate	individual	abilities	of
category	members	(Heilman	1995;	Petersen	2009).
1.3 	Persistent	inequalities	could	be	due	to	purposeful	discrimination.	Statistical	discrimination	is	based	on
objective	statistical	differences	between	the	categories.	For	instance,	there	is	a	well-documented
difference	between	men	and	women	in	average	emotional	support	for	children	(Wellman	&	Wortley
1990;	de	Waal	2005).	In	this	case,	trusting	a	woman	more	than	a	man	when	looking	for	a	baby-sitter
could	be	viewed	as	"rational"	statistical	discrimination	similar	to	pricing	practices	of	insurance
companies	based	on	hazard	categories.	Purposeful	discrimination	that	is	not	based	on	objective
statistical	differences	is	usually	attributed	to	cognitive	or	"uneconomic	aspects"	(Allport	1954;	Kalter
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2000)	or	tastes	(Becker	1971).
1.4 	Discrimination	might	be	channeled	by	harmless	social	practices.	For	instance,	hair	color	does	not	make
a	difference	in	car	driving	or	in	task	performance	in	secretary	work,	still,	blond	women	are	widely	labeled
as	clumsy,	less	effective,	and	they	are	subject	to	many	derogating	jokes	(e.g.,	Benokraitis	1997).	In
general,	recognizable	traits	(e.g.,	gender,	ethnicity,	hair	color)	are	factually	irrelevant	for	job	quality	as
there	is	no	statistical	basis	to	discriminate	members	of	different	categories.	Still,	employers	use	these
traits	"as	inexpensive	screening	devices	when	hiring	for	jobs,	particularly	skilled	jobs,	in	the	belief
(correct	or	not)	that	race	and	sex	status	are,	on	average,	related	to	productivity.	Individual	workers	are
stereotyped	as	qualified	or	not,	with	more	attention	given	to	their	membership	in	a	race	or	sex	group."
(Kaufman	2002,	550).
1.5 	This	paper	shows	that	in	an	idealized	labor	market	without	any	historical	path-dependence	and	with	fair
employers	who	lack	innate	tendencies	or	preferences	for	discrimination,	inequality	still	emerges.	This
hypothesis	builds	on	earlier	results	that	showed	that	'unfair'	conditions	can	emerge	in	cases	of
asymmetric	information	due	to	sampling	bias	(Simon	1955,	Simon	1956;	Denrell	2005;	Denrell	&	Le
Mens	2007;	Fiedler	&	Juslin	2006;	Le	Mens	&	Denrell	2011).
1.6 	In	addition,	we	wanted	to	understand	why	high	status	jobs	are	particularly	susceptible	to	discrimination.
For	instance,	research	shows	that	women	are	under-represented	in	top	jobs	in	particular,	which	is	often
described	as	the	'glass	ceiling'	phenomenon	(Powell	&	Butterfield	1994).	Some	studies	have	explained
this	by	looking	at	the	supply	side	of	the	labor	market,	namely	on	gender	differences	in	expectations
(Evetts	1993),	time	constraints	and	opportunities	(Bielby	&	Bielby	1992;	Albrecht	et	al.	1999;	McBrier
2003),	or	aspirations	(women	do	not	get	top	jobs	because	they	do	not	want	to	get	there	as	much	as	men
do,	see	Polachek	1981).	Our	hypothesis	is	that	discrimination	in	jobs	offered	by	employers	with	high
standards	will	be	higher	than	in	jobs	offered	by	employers	with	medium	or	low	standards.
1.7 	We	examined	a	situation	in	which	individuals	were	unaware	of	the	statistical	distributions	of	quality	and
learnt	only	from	their	own	experience.	We	looked	at	why	and	how	discrimination	could	emerge	as	an
unintended	consequence	of	intentional	and	fair	action.	We	built	a	simple	model	that	diverged	from
analytical	models	of	wage	differences	in	economics	(Lucas	&	Prescott	1974;	Burdett	&	Mortensen	1980;
Diamond	1981,	1982;	Mortensen	1986;	Flabbi	2010),	from	labor	market	experiments	that	looked	at	the
persistence	of	discrimination	(Riach	&	Rich	2002,	Riach	&	Rich	2004),	from	earlier	computational	and
agent-based	models	that	investigated	matching	functions	that	lead	to	efficient	equilibria	(Richiardi	2004;
Neugart	2004,	2008;	Fagiolo	et	al.	2004),	and	from	earlier	work	describing	workplace	segregation
(Abdou	&	Gilbert	2009;	Tassier	2005;	Tassier	&	Menczer	2008),	or	structures	and	traps	of	referral	hiring
(Tassier	&	Menczer	2001;	Stovel	&	Fountain	2009;	Gemkow	&	Neugart	2011;	Fountain	&	Stovel	2014).
Here,	similarly	to	Tassier	and	Menczer	(2008),	who	showed	that	inequality	might	arise	in	the	labor
market	under	different	social	structures	via	referral	hiring,	we	focused	on	the	emergence	of	large-scale
labor	market	inequality	under	fair	market	conditions	and	asymmetric	information.
1.8 	In	our	model,	we	considered	hiring	as	a	two-sided	matching	process	without	referrals,	where
employers	select	applicants	and	workers	can	accept	or	reject	offers.	Therefore,	disproportional	hiring	is
not	necessarily	due	to	employer	selection,	but	it	could	be	due	to	the	applicants'	ambition.	This	is	a	well-
known	phenomenon	for	educational	attainment	(Boudon	1981),	as	well	as	for	progress	in	the	labor
market	(Polachek	1981).	Conventional	wisdom	confirms	the	mismatch	that	the	best	jobs	are	not	filled
with	the	best	workers,	but	with	the	most	ambitious	ones,	which	results	in	inefficiency	overall.	If	ambition
correlates	with	quality,	then	rational	employers	could	consider	ambition	as	a	credible	signal.	Ambition,
however,	does	not	necessarily	correlate	positively	with	skills	or	quality.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	ambition
is	a	cheap	signal:	the	presence	of	the	signal	does	not	contain	any	reliable	information	for	the	employers
and	should	not	be	taken	seriously.	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	however,	the	potential	of	signaling	with
ambition	is	not	considered	in	our	model.
1.9 	In	this	study,	we	investigated	how	an	ambition	trap	could	emerge,	i.e.,	how	ambitious	workers	could
end	up	in	the	best	jobs,	even	if	they	had	quality	lower	than	average.	We	show	that	zero	or	even	a
negative	level	of	correlation	between	quality	and	ambition	could	lead	to	a	disproportional	concentration
of	ambitious	workers	in	the	best	jobs	due	to	their	higher	willingness	of	extended	exploration.
Model
2.1 	We	modeled	a	small	job	market,	in	which	a	fixed	number	of	employers	(E)	select	employees	for	a
restricted	number	of	jobs	(J	each).[1]	We	assumed	that	there	are	more	workers	than	available	jobs	(
N > E ∗ J),	hence	there	is	unemployment	(cf.	Abdou	&	Gilbert	2009).	Employers	hire	workers	for	a	fixed
contract	period	of	one	year,	during	which	the	contract	cannot	be	broken.	Both	employees	and
employers	have	an	internal	quality	taken	from	a	distribution	with	possible	integer	values	between	0	and
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19.	We	assumed	that	quality	scores	summarize	different	aspects	of	worker	skills	and	different	aspects
of	firm	quality	(wage,	working	conditions)	in	a	single	dimension.	Note	that	jobs	within	the	firm	were
assumed	to	be	identical	(firms	had	internal	qualities	and	not	jobs).	The	scale	of	{0,	1,	…,	19}	is	arbitrarily
chosen	and	has	no	impact	on	our	results.	Here,	we	have	discussed	only	results	from	simulations	in
which	a	uniform	distribution	of	qualities	were	assumed.	We	have	analyzed	scenarios	with	alternative
(e.g.,	normal)	distributions	and	found	similar	results.
2.2 	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	we	assumed	that	individual	quality	is	exogenously	given,	fixed	over	time,	and
hence	does	not	improve	with	experience.	We	considered	one	recognizable	trait	for	workers	(e.g.,
gender)	and	two	social	categories	of	this	trait	(e.g.,	men	and	women)	and	fixed	category	membership.
Here,	we	have	discussed	only	results	for	equal	numbers	of	workers	in	both	categories	(N1 = N2 = N/2).
2.3 	While	workers	vary	in	quality,	the	variations	are	independent	of	category	membership.	Therefore,	there
is	no	statistical	basis	for	discrimination.	We	assumed	that	all	employers	are	perfectly	neutral,	i.e.,	they
do	not	belong	to	any	of	the	workers'	social	categories	and	do	not	have	any	initial	bias	towards	them.	We
considered	asymmetric	information	in	the	sense	that	employers	are	unable	to	observe	the	true	individual
quality	of	workers	until	they	hire	them.	They	can	observe,	however,	the	social	category	of	applicants,
which	is	the	characteristic	of	empirical	hiring	situations	(Akerlof	1976).
2.4 	Selection	and	acceptance	decisions	were	based	on	the	aspiration	levels	{0,	1,	…,	19}	of	employers	and
ambition	levels	{0,	1,	…,	19}	of	workers;	both	were	taken	from	a	uniform	random	distribution	except
otherwise	noted.	Individual	aspiration	and	ambition	levels	act	as	reservation	thresholds	and	are	fixed
over	time.	The	highest	levels	imply	that	individuals	search	for	the	best	available	option	(cf.	Boero	et	al.
2010)	and	are	not	satisfied	unless	they	find	it.	Each	employer	forms	reputations	about	the	two	groups
based	on	private	experience	with	the	workers.	Group	reputations	for	each	employer	are	calculated	as
the	mean	quality	of	the	workers	hired	from	that	category	in	the	previous	m	periods.	Reputations	are
updated	after	every	round	(year)	of	employment	and	vary	between	employers,	and	in	practice	replace
employer	aspiration	thresholds	over	time.
2.5 	We	considered	a	two-sided	matching	protocol	in	which	hiring	into	job	positions	takes	place	sequentially.
Employers	try	to	fill	all	their	jobs,	while	workers	can	accept	or	reject	job	offers.	This	protocol	is	different
from	labor	market	models	that	consider	an	aggregate	matching	function	instead	of	actual	individual
choice	(Pissarides	1979;	Montgomery	1991;	Merz	1995;	Petrongolo	&	Pissarides	2001).	Our	matching
protocol	also	diverges	from	microeconomic	search	models	that	focus	on	a	single,	representative	agent
(Simon	1955;	Stigler	1961;	Mortensen	1970),	from	those	that	consider	wage	determination	as	the	key
aspect	of	equilibrium	search	(Becker	1971;	Arrow	1972,	1973;	Rogerson	et	al.	2004),	or	assume
homogeneity	of	workers	and	firms	with	regard	to	needs	and	quality	(Diamond	1981,	1982;	Mortensen
1982;	Pissarides	1984,	1985).
2.6 	It	is	worth	noting	that	varying	micro	mechanisms	have	been	successfully	used	to	understand	hiring
practices,	but	none	is	accepted	generally	(Petrongolo	&	Pissarides	2001).	We	thought	to	departure	from
equation-based	models	to	consider	action-based	models,	at	the	same	time	keeping	agent	decisions	as
simple	as	possible	(cf.	Lewkovicz	&	Kant	2008).	We	started	from	certain	rules	of	thumb	that	reflect
bounded	rationality	rather	than	perfectly	optimizing	behavior	("satisficing"	rather	than	"maximizing"),
while	looking	at	the	two-sided	character	of	search	in	the	labor	market.
2.7 	In	our	model,	each	available	job	was	filled	in	the	following	way.	The	employer	checked	previous
employees	he	was	satisfied	with	and	picked	the	one	available	with	the	highest	quality.	The	contract	has
been	extended	if	the	employee's	quality	was	higher	than	the	group	reputation	scores.	This	assumption
is	in	line	with	the	empirical	fact	that	employers	solve	the	problem	of	asymmetric	information	internally,	if
they	can	(e.g.,	Williamson	1985;	Greenwald	&	Stiglitz	1990).	Among	the	available	and	high	quality
workers,	selection	is	based	on	quality	ranking	(Blanchard	&	Diamond	1994).	Employers	do	not	keep
anyone	below	their	thresholds	in	house,	as	they	rationally	expect	that	a	random	worker	(at	least	from
one	category)	has	a	higher	quality	than	their	current	employee.	We	assumed	that	new	workers
accepted	contracts	automatically,	as	they	had	no	available	information	on	job	quality	in	advance.	If	they
worked	at	the	firm	before,	we	assumed	they	rejected	the	proposal	if	the	job	quality	was	below	their
ambition	level.
2.8 	If	there	was	no	previous	employee	who	satisfied	the	previous	condition,	an	unemployed	worker	was
picked	randomly	from	a	group	with	higher	reputation.	This	follows	the	idea	that	employers	have	no
information	about	the	quality	of	workers	who	were	not	contracted	previously	and	they	can	observe
category	membership	only.	Therefore,	worker	performance	has	human	capital	externalities	to	the
(ethnic)	group,	as	suggested	by	studies	in	economics	(Borjas	1995).	Note	that	it	does	not	mean	that
employers	are	innate	discriminators	but	rather	the	opposite:	a	higher	group	reputation	is	easily	ruined
and	balanced	by	a	new	and	less	satisfactory	employee.
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2.9 	If	group	reputation	was	equal	(e.g.,	at	the	outset),	then	an	unemployed	worker	was	randomly	selected.
This	procedure	was	repeated	until	all	jobs	were	filled	and	no	vacancies	remained.	If	workers	were	hired
by	an	employer,	they	were	unavailable	for	any	other	job.	This	meant	that	in	our	model	there	are
externalities	of	selection	choices,	which	creates	interdependence	between	hiring	decisions.	As	a
consequence,	a	shortage	of	high	quality	workers	can	quickly	take	place	in	the	labor	market.
2.10 	The	quality	of	employees	was	remembered	by	the	employer	from	the	last	employment	until	m	periods,
irrespective	of	the	employee's	quality.	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	we	assumed	that	the	memory
parameter	m	was	the	same	for	all	employers.	It	is	worth	outlining	that	memory	limitation	is	an
assumption	that	prevents	the	system	from	running	into	a	market	with	full	information	and	follows
empirical	findings	showing	that	people	have	limited	capacity	of	information	processing	(Miller	1956;
Cowan	2001).	Finally,	note	that	our	matching	procedure	neglects	important	economic	factors,	such	as
wage	and	company	profit.	We	compressed	all	relevant	returns	from	the	job	into	a	single	quality	score
and	we	did	not	deal	with	endogenous	dynamics,	such	as	the	creation	of	new	jobs	at	more	successful
firms.
Measures
2.11 	As	a	dependent	measure,	we	used	macro	level	discrimination	δ	as	the	objective	extent	to	which
members	from	different	groups	were	hired	disproportionally.	We	defined	δ	as
δ =
|H1 −H2 |
max {H1,H2},
(1)
where	H1 ≤ N1	was	the	number	of	hired	workers	from	category	1.	The	index	is	0	in	case	of	no	inequality
in	employment,	and	1	when	each	job	is	filled	with	workers	belonging	to	the	same	category.	Macro	level
discrimination	is	distinguished	from	micro	level	discrimination	δi,	which	is	the	average	extent	to	which
individual	employers	stock	up	employees	from	the	same	group.	The	micro	level	discrimination	index	δi
is	calculated	as	Eq.1	for	each	individual	employer	and	then	averaged	over	all	employers.
2.12 	The	concentration	of	ambitious	workers	in	better	jobs	was	measured	by	the	Pearson	correlation	of
obtained	firm	quality	and	ambition.	Similarly,	we	used	this	measure	to	describe	the	concentration	of
good	workers	in	good	jobs.	After	the	quality	qi	of	worker	i	was	determined	from	a	random	uniform
distribution,	the	ambition	ai	of	i	was	either	taken	randomly	(in	case	of	perfect	independence,	r = 0)	or
was	assigned	according	to	the	following	procedure:	first,	all	workers	were	assigned	a	random	ambition
level	a ∗i .	Secondly,	both	quality	and	ambition	were	standardized	a	mean	of	zero	and	standard	deviation
of	one.	Thirdly,	we	used	a	linear	transformation	of
ai =
r
√1 − r2qi + a ∗i .
(2)
Subsequently,	means	and	variances	were	back-adjusted	by	simple	linear	transformations	to	the	{0;	19}
range	and	floored	to	the	integer	below.	This	allowed	us	to	obtain	a	correlation	between	qi	and	ai	that
was	close	to	the	required	correlation	r.	The	correlation	between	employer	aspirations	and	quality	of	jobs
was	imposed	using	the	same	procedure.
Results
3.1 	Our	results	are	presented	in	the	following	structure.	First,	we	examined	whether	discrimination	emerged
in	our	idealized	labor	market	or	not.	We	reported	the	discrimination	indexes	and	the	correlation	indexes
about	the	concentration	of	high	quality	workers	in	good	firms	and	the	concentration	of	ambitious	workers
in	good	firms	as	dependent	measures.	In	order	to	understand	the	effect	of	the	aspiration	levels	on	our
dependent	variables,	we	assigned	the	same	aspiration	level	to	each	firm	and	varied	this	value	stepwise,
while	keeping	any	other	parameters	fixed.	Second,	we	fixed	the	aspiration	level	of	the	employer	to	the
minimum	value	and	analyzed	the	impact	of	the	correlation	between	worker	ambitions	and	quality	on	the
same	set	of	dependent	variables.	Furthermore,	we	repeated	the	same	experiment	for	the	case	in	which
we	fixed	the	aspiration	level	of	the	employer	to	its	maximum	and	intermediate	values.	Finally,	we
reported	results	also	from	simulations	in	which	employer	aspiration	were	heterogeneous	to	provide	a
robustness	test	of	previous	findings.
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3.2 	Our	first	aim	was	to	understand	whether	discrimination	could	emerge	without	any	differences	in	quality
between	the	workers'	social	categories.	Fig.	1	shows	results	from	our	first	experiment	in	which	we
assigned	the	same	aspiration	level	to	each	firm	and	varied	this	value	stepwise,	while	keeping	any	other
parameters	fixed.	We	found	that	the	micro	level	discrimination	δi	was	around	0.8	(st.dev.=0.06)	even	for
the	zero	aspiration	level	of	employers.	This	doubled	the	expected	value	of	0.416,	which	we	would	have
obtained	had	employers	selected	six	workers	always	at	random.
3.3 	The	large	difference	between	the	micro	and	the	macro	level	discrimination	values	indicates	that
discrimination	is	primarily	a	bias	inherent	in	individual	decision	making.	The	macro	level	discrimination
index	δ	was	above	0.21	for	all	employer	aspiration	levels	and	therefore	higher	than	the	value	of	0.125
that	we	would	have	obtained	if	8	of	15	employers	had	discriminated	one	group	fully	and	others	the	other
group	perfectly.
3.4 	On	the	one	hand,	this	meant	that	individual	bias,	which	made	employers	discriminate	against	members
of	one	category,	did	not	linearly	result	at	the	aggregate	level.	The	macro	level	discrimination	in	favor	of
one	of	the	categories	emerged	early	in	the	first	contract	years	and	then	stabilized	(see	Fig.	2	for	some
typical	runs).	On	the	other	hand,	this	was	likely	due	to	a	random	binomial	process	in	which	employers
totally	discriminated	one	of	the	groups.	Indeed,	the	observed	macro	level	discrimination	index	for	low
aspiration	values	was	close	to	a	value	that	would	have	occurred	if,	in	half	of	the	cases,	8	out	15,	and	in
the	other	half	of	the	cases,	9	out	of	15	employers	had	perfectly	discriminated	one	of	the	groups.
Figure	1.	Discrimination	and	the	trap	of	ambition	as	a	function	of	employers'	aspiration	level.	Mean
values	and	95%	confidence	intervals	of	the	micro	level	δi	discrimination	index,	of	the	δ	discrimination
index,	of	the	observed	correlation	between	worker	quality	and	firm's	quality,	and	of	the	observed
correlation	between	ambition	and	firm	quality.	Each	single	value	is	the	average	of	the	index	in	the
given	simulation	run.	Each	simulation	run	lasted	for	100	contract	years	(which	means	that	100	values
of	each	index	were	averaged	for	each	single	observation).	Results	are	from	a	total	of	10,000	runs	in
which	ambition	and	worker	quality	were	perfectly	independent.	The	aspiration	level	of	each	of	15
employers	was	fixed	to	the	same	integer	value,	which	was	varied	across	runs.	J = 6,	N = 200,	m = 10.
See	the	Measures	section	for	definitions.
Figure	2.	Six	randomly	selected	runs	to	illustrate	the	early	development	of	discrimination.	Note	that	the
two	panels	belong	to	the	same	simulation	run.	The	panel	above	shows	the	average	number	of	hired
workers	in	the	two	categories,	while	that	below	shows	the	average	values	of	group	reputations	among
the	employers	(green	and	blue	colored	lines).	Only	the	first	15	contract	years	were	included	as	no
major	changes	have	been	observed	later.	Simulations	had	identical	parameter	values	as	in	Fig.	1.
3.5 	We	found	that	higher	employer	aspiration	levels	led	to	higher	discrimination	rates.	This	is	a	general
result	that	occurred	for	aspiration	levels	higher	than	the	scale	mean	(Fig.	1).	Specifically,	there	was	a
linear	increase	in	discrimination	for	aspiration	levels	higher	than	the	scale	mean.	Fig.	1	shows	that
almost	all	employers	(E = 15)	were	perfect	discriminators	when	they	had	the	highest	aspiration	levels.
As	employers	were	never	completely	satisfied,	high	aspiration	levels	resulted	in	higher	turnover	rates.
The	finding	that	the	highest	aspiration	levels	lead	to	the	highest	levels	of	inequality,	and	consequently	to
inefficiency,	resonates	to	some	elementary	results	of	search	theory	stating	that	search	beyond	the
reservation	price	is	not	profitable.	This	line	of	research,	however,	concentrates	on	efficiency,	rather	than
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inequality.
3.6 	The	macro	level	discrimination	index	δ	also	increased	in	its	value	with	higher	employer	aspirations.
Particularly	for	the	highest	aspiration	levels,	there	was	more	discrepancy	between	the	categories	at	the
macro	level	than	expected	from	random	distribution	of	individual	discriminating	tendencies.	The
increased	level	of	discrepancy	at	the	macro	level	was	clearly	the	consequence	of	the	limited	supply	of
high	quality	workers.	The	limited	supply	of	high	quality	workers	in	case	of	high	employer	aspirations
resulted	in	a	high	turnover	rate,	which	in	turn	attenuated	initial	differences	due	to	initial	choice	and	to
random	statistical	differences	between	the	categories.	With	an	extremely	extended	labor	supply	and
sufficient	number	of	workers	with	the	highest	qualities,	the	aspiration	trap	would	have	faded	away.
3.7 	We	also	found	a	concentration	of	the	most	ambitious	workers	in	the	best	jobs,	even	if	worker	quality
and	ambition	were	perfectly	independent	and	employers	did	not	consider	ambition	for	selection.	This
result	was	obtained	from	a	wide	range	of	parameter	values.	In	the	example	shown	in	Fig.	1,	the
correlation	between	a	firm's	quality	and	worker	ambition	was	around	one	third	for	low	employer
aspiration	levels.	Although	the	ambition	trap	appeared	under	various	conditions,	it	generally	decreased
when	employers	had	higher	aspirations.	It	is	interesting	that	higher	employer	aspirations	also	decreased
the	concentration	of	better	workers	in	better	jobs.	This	means	that	not	only	did	desperate	attempts	to	get
the	best	workers	increase	discrimination	and	unequal	handling	of	equal	groups;	they	also	created	a	less
meritocratic	system,	in	which	better	workers	did	not	end	up	in	better	available	jobs.
Figure	3.	Labor	market	mismatch	occurs	for	any	correlation	between	workers'	ambition	and	quality.	Mean	values	and	95%
confidence	intervals	of	the	micro	level	δi	discrimination	index,	of	the	δ	discrimination	index,	of	the	observed	correlation
between	worker	quality	and	firm's	quality,	and	of	the	observed	correlation	between	ambition	and	firm's	quality	in	a	total	of
57000	runs.	Each	single	value	is	the	average	of	the	index	in	the	given	simulation	run.	Each	simulation	run	lasted	for	100
contract	years	(which	means	that	100	values	of	each	index	were	averaged	for	each	single	observation).	The	correlation
between	ambition	of	workers	and	their	quality	was	imposed	according	to	the	procedure	described	in	the	Measures	section
and	varied	from	−0.9	to	0.9	in	steps	of	0.1	across	runs.	E = 15,	J = 6,	N = 200,	m = {3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50},	the	employer
aspiration	level	was	fixed	to	0	in	all	runs.
3.8 	We	manipulated	the	correlation	between	worker	quality	and	ambition	in	our	second	experiment,	while
we	fixed	the	aspiration	level	of	the	employer	to	its	minimum	value.	First,	note	that	micro	level
discrimination	was	high	for	any	correlation	value.	Macro	level	discrimination	was	present	for	high
correlation	values.	Indeed,	high	correlations	between	worker	quality	and	ambition	increased	employer
expectations	that	lead	to	a	shortage	of	best	workers	in	the	group	that	was	favored	on	average.
Secondly,	we	expected	that	increasing	the	correlation	between	worker	quality	and	ambition	would	have
strengthened	the	concentration	of	ambitious	workers	in	the	best	jobs.	This	hypothesis	was	confirmed	as
we	found	a	positive	relationship	(Fig.	3).	Except	for	extreme	correlation	values,	an	ambition	trap
occurred	even	if	ambition	and	quality	were	negatively	related.	This	meant	that	the	most	ambitious
workers	received	the	best	jobs	even	if	their	quality	was	on	average	lower	than	that	of	less	ambitious
workers.	Note	that	ambitious	workers	received	better	jobs	even	though	employers	did	not	take	ambition
into	account	for	selection.
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Figure	4.	Labor	market	mismatch	in	case	of	maximum	aspirations	of	employers.	Mean	values	and	95%	confidence	intervals
of	the	micro	level	δi	discrimination	index,	of	the	δ	discrimination	index,	of	the	observed	correlation	between	ambition	and
firm's	quality,	and	of	the	observed	correlation	between	worker	quality	and	firm's	quality	in	a	total	of	9500	runs.	Each	single
value	is	the	average	of	the	index	in	the	given	simulation	run.	Each	simulation	run	lasted	for	100	contract	years	(which
means	that	100	values	of	each	index	were	averaged	for	each	single	observation).	The	correlation	between	ambition	of
workers	and	their	quality	was	imposed	according	to	the	procedure	described	in	the	Measures	section	and	varied	from	−0.9
to	0.9	in	steps	of	0.1	across	runs.	E = 15,	J = 6,	N = 200,	m = 10,	employer	aspiration	level	was	19.
3.9 	In	our	third	experiment,	we	manipulated	the	correlation	between	worker	quality	and	ambition	again,
while	we	fixed	the	aspiration	level	of	the	employer	to	its	maximum	and	intermediate	values.	Our	results
showed	that	the	labor	market	could	never	achieve	a	perfect	matching	of	worker	quality	and	firm	quality.
The	concentration	of	better	workers	in	better	jobs	improved	when	the	correlation	between	ambition	and
quality	increased,	but	a	close	match	of	worker	and	firm	quality	was	never	found.	For	instance,	in	the
case	of	the	highest	aspiration	levels,	the	correlation	between	worker	and	firm	quality	never	even
reached	0.14	(Fig.	4).	Fig.	5	shows	the	three-way	association	between	aspiration	level,	the	correlation
of	ambition	and	worker	quality,	and	the	correlation	of	ambition	and	the	firm's	obtained	quality	(as
dependent	variable).
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Figure	5.	Average	values	of	the	observed	correlation	of	ambition	and	firm's	quality.	Results	are	from	a	total
of	57000	runs.	Each	single	correlation	value	is	the	average	from	the	given	simulation	run.	Each	simulation
run	lasted	for	100	contract	years	(which	means	that	100	correlation	values	were	averaged	for	each	single
observation).	The	correlation	between	ambition	of	workers	and	their	quality	was	imposed	according	to	the
procedure	described	in	the	Measures	section	and	varied	from	−0.9	to	0.9	in	steps	of	0.1	across	runs.	The
aspiration	level	of	each	of	15	employers	was	fixed	to	the	same	integer	value,	which	was	varied	across
runs.	J = 6,	N = 200	workers,	m = 10.
3.10 	In	our	last	experiment,	we	relaxed	the	assumption	that	employers	had	the	same	aspiration	levels.	This
was	to	check	whether	the	aspiration	trap	and	the	ambition	trap	were	simply	due	to	the	uniformity	of
employer	aspiration	levels.	Fig.	6	shows	that	there	was	no	qualitative	difference	when	we	relaxed	the
assumption	of	homogeneity.
3.11 	We	also	tested	whether	our	results	were	robust	against	a	wider	range	of	parameter	values.	We	did	not
find	any	qualitatively	significant	deviation	from	the	results	reported	above.	Among	the	control	variables,
memory	of	employers	had	a	remarkable	effect	both	on	discrimination	and	on	the	correlation	of	ambition
and	firm's	quality.	Longer	memory	enlarged	the	available	pool	of	information	and	decreased
discrimination,	but	it	increased	the	extent	of	the	ambition	trap	under	any	aspiration	level	as	well	as	the
initial	correlation	of	ambition	and	worker	quality.
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Figure	6.	Heterogeneous	aspirations	do	not	prevent	labor	market	mismatch.	Mean	values	and	95%	confidence	intervals	of
the	micro	level	δi	discrimination	index,	of	the	δ	discrimination	index,	of	the	observed	correlation	between	worker	quality	and
firm's	quality,	and	of	the	observed	correlation	between	ambition	and	firm's	quality	in	a	total	of	9500	runs.	Each	single	value
is	the	average	of	the	index	in	the	given	simulation	run.	Each	simulation	run	lasted	for	100	contract	years	(which	means	that
100	values	of	each	index	were	averaged	for	each	single	observation).	E = 15,	J = 6,	N = 200,	m = 10,	employer	aspiration
levels	were	taken	from	a	random	uniform	distribution.
Discussion
4.1 	Partner	selection	does	not	work	efficiently	in	various	social	contexts.	As	search	theory	has
demonstrated,	in	case	of	asymmetric	information,	maximizing	principles	(looking	for	the	best	options)	do
not	lead	to	higher	profit,	while	higher	utility	is	achieved	when	the	search	stops	at	the	first	option	that	is
within	the	reservation	price.	We	constructed	a	simple	model	of	two-sided	matching	and	demonstrated
that	in	addition	to	mismatch,	discrimination	emerges	as	an	unintended	and	un-institutionalized	process,
simply	as	a	result	of	selection	decisions	that	are	based	on	experience.	This	implies	that	in	case	of
asymmetric	information,	optimal	matching	and	equality	in	employment	is	hard	to	achieve,	even	if
opportunities	are	not	biased	in	any	sense.	In	our	study,	we	modeled	hiring	in	labor	markets	and	showed
that	perfectly	neutral	employers	widely	discriminated	between	groups.	No	true	statistical	difference
between	individual	types	was	necessary	to	generate	discrimination.	We	showed	that,	even	with	fair
employers,	individual	discrimination	was	extreme	and	caused	inequality	at	the	aggregate	level.
4.2 	Our	simulations	show	that	inequality	can	be	the	unintended	consequence	of	a	neutral	hiring	process,
similar	to	other	judgment	bias	during	repeated	sampling	(cf.	Simon	1955,	1956;	Denrell	2005;	Fiedler	&
Juslin	2006;	Denrell	&	Le	Mens	2007;	Le	Mens	&	Denrell	2011).	Hence,	statistical	differences	and	built-
in	preferences	and	prejudices	cannot	be	considered	as	the	only	mechanisms	responsible	for	inequality
in	the	employment	rates	of	different	groups.	This	contrasts	with	the	economists'	view	that	discrimination
should	not	persist	if	beliefs	were	incorrect	as	employers	not	sharing	false	beliefs	would	gain	a
competitive	advantage	(Arrow	1973;	Aigner	&	Cain	1977).	Indeed,	there	is	poor	empirical	evidence	that
employer	practices	reflect	any	efficient	and	rational	response	to	differences	in	skills	and	turnover	costs
(Bielby	&	Baron	1986).
4.3 	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	was	possible	as	in	our	model	we	intentionally	excluded	other	empirically
relevant	factors	and	mechanisms,	such	as	referral	hiring	(Fernandez	et	al.	2000;	Fernandez	&
Fernandez-Mateo	2006;	Stovel	&	Fountain	2009;	Fountain	&	Stovel	2014),	on-the-job	search	(Richiardi
2004,	Richiardi	2006);	market	evolution	(Ballot	2002;	Neugart	2004;	Fagiolo	et	al.	2004),	and
endogenous	policy	(Neugart	2004,	Neugart	2008).	Our	results	show	that	discrimination	is	prevalent	even
without	these	auxiliary	assumptions,	which	would	likely	to	lead	to	even	higher	inequality.
4.4 	Secondly,	we	showed	that	discrimination	was	intensified	when	employers	had	high	aspirations.
Employers'	high	aspirations	are	typical	for	high-status,	high-wage	jobs.	Our	results	indicate	that	when
available	expertise	is	limited,	high	aspirations	do	not	pay	off	and	lead	to	more	judgment	partiality.	This
result	confirms	the	"paradox	of	meritocracy";	according	to	which	organizations	with	meritocratic
evaluation	may	ironically	show	greater	bias,	for	instance,	in	favor	of	men	over	equally	performing
women	(Castilla	&	Benard	2010).	Third,	our	model	confirmed	conventional	wisdom:	in	the	simulation
scenarios	where	worker	quality	and	ambition	were	independently	set,	the	most	ambitious	workers
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achieved	the	highest	quality	jobs.	Even	if	worker	quality	and	ambition	were	negatively	correlated,
ambitious	workers	ended	up	in	better	jobs.
4.5 	Finally,	note	that	worker	ambitions	were	not	updated	during	our	simulations.	Endogenous	ambition
updates	are	important	both	theoretically	and	empirically	in	reinforcement	learning	and	various	social
interactions	(see	e.g.,	Diekmann	&	Preisendörfer	1998;	Macy	&	Flache	2002;	Bendor,	Diermeier	&	Ting
2003;	Izquierdo,	Gotts	&Polhill	2004;	Matsen	and	Nowak	2004).	In	future	model	extensions,	we	could
explore	the	macro	implications	of	different	variants	of	endogenous	ambitions,	reinforcement	learning
and	strategic	matching	on	labor	market	dynamics.
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Notes
	1Our	agent-based	model	was	built	in	NetLogo	(Wilensky	1999).	We	re-implemented	the	model	in
Repast	in	order	to	check	its	internal	validity.	Both	versions	are	available	at	the	CoMSES	Net	(Network
for	Computational	Modeling	in	the	Social	and	Ecological	Sciences):
https://www.openabm.org/model/4379/version/2/view.
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